

ND047527260



History

Advanced Subsidiary

Paper 1: Breadth study with interpretations

Option 1G: Germany and West Germany, 1918–89

Wednesday 18 May 2016 – Afternoon

Time: 2 hours 15 minutes

Paper Reference

8HI0/1G

You must have:

Extracts Booklet (enclosed)

Total Marks

53

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are three sections in this question paper. Answer **ONE** question from Section A, **ONE** question in Section B and the question from Section C.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
– *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 60.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
– *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ►

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SECTION A

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

- 1** Was popular support for Hitler the main reason for the lack of effective opposition to the Nazi regime in the years 1933–45?

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)

OR

- 2** Were improved living standards the main consequence of German economic policies in the years 1933–45?

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)



SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 1 ☒

Question 2 ☒

16 marks

Popular support - No, although approval polls + Austria,
in it had vote 35%.

SS Gestapo state -

Ban on oppo. -

Unity through Propaganda + Scapegoats.

Popular support for Hitler was not the main reason for the lack of effective opposition in the era of the Nazi regime, as factors such as the SS & Gestapo police state, ban of opposition in 1934 and effective propaganda contributed far more effectively. The criteria for judgement is based upon how far each factor definitively promoted support or prevented opposition from posing a threat, or indeed, arising whatsoever in the period 1933-45.

Popular support for the Nazi Government was not the primary reason for the lack of effective opposition down to the fact that it was not necessarily support for Hitler that gained the Nazis power, nor



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(Section A continued) did popular support for Hitler ~~not~~ show any correlation with activity of opposition groups.

The prime examples of this were in the several referendums held under the Nazi regime, most specifically those over the appointment of Hitler to the role of Führer in 1934 and the confirmation of Anschluss in 1938. Whilst the Nazi government received a positive vote of upwards of 98% in both referendums, there is no correlation between this incredibly high approval rate of Hitler and his government, and the reduction in opposition. Indeed, the further the regime progressed, ~~on~~ with 79% approval rates in the '37 and '39 elections, opposition, especially from the Church - in the pope's ¹⁹³⁸ 'Mit brennender Sorge' speech - only seemed to increase whilst approval ratings were still incredibly and unwaveringly high. Not only does this show a lack of correlation between support for Hitler and level of opposition, but it also suggests these votes may have been rigged in some manner either through ballot tampering or SS pressure, meaning the actual level of support for Hitler may have been far lower. Therefore, the lack of correlation between voting statistics and



(Section A continued)

level of opposition, ineffective or otherwise, as well as the lack of reliable evidence for support of Hitler himself shows that the popularity of Hitler neither promoted genuine support, nor prevented opposition arising in the Nazi era.

Much of this unreliable ~~of~~ evidence for support, was, however, a product of the harsh and ever-present SS Gestapo police state. Not only were the SS allegedly present at every election or referendum, effectively threatening voters into voting for the Nazis, but the wide ranging plain clothed Gestapo ^{organisation} was responsible for the removal of a huge number of opposition groups under the Nazi government, such as the imprisonment and burning of the Red Shock Troop group and newspaper in 1933. The Gestapo could act beyond the boundaries of the law, and could arrest and send government opponents to concentration camps. Alongside the creation of the People's Court for crimes against the Reich, the combined SS and Gestapo police state were able to forcefully remove any opposition groups without formal trial, and therefore were also likely instrumental to the lack of effective opposition in



(Section A continued) Nazi Germany as the groups could ~~not only~~ prevent opposition from arising before it could gain any momentum whatsoever.

The 1934 ban on opposition was one that prevented any ^{formal} ~~any~~ political opponents to the Nazi government, and was therefore extremely important in the lack of effective opposition.

The ban, triggered by the 1933 Reichstag fire and allowed by the 1933 Enabling act removed all non-Nazi political parties and trade unions. This meant, with a lack of ability to form any formal opposition to government, alongside the harsh preventative measures provided by the police state, there was a near-total lack of ~~opposit~~ ability to form opposition groups. Some left wing organisations did continue outside Germany, with the Red Orchestra feeding information to the allies through Russia in the early years of the war, and the SPD forming as the SOPADE abroad and performing a similar function. However, these groups often did not survive such as the case of the Abwehr raid on the Red Orchestra's headquarters in 1941 which all but destroyed the organisation. This shows, then, that the combination of the police state and ban on opposition cruelly prevented any effective opposition from forming, succeeding where



(Section A continued) the so called 'cult of der Führer' failed to suppress effective opposition.

Another area in which the Nazis controlled opposition was through their effective use of propaganda. Whilst the somewhat dubious results of elections fail to show correlation between the popularity of Hitler and the effectiveness of opposition, the presence of propaganda, most specifically race related propaganda was very effective in promoting support for the state as well as preventing opposition. Nazi propaganda tactics were heavily focused on race and financial stance as one body, the image of the 'Jewish communist' being one that was much perpetuated in education, the KDF Nazi trade union and through other propaganda techniques, such as the easily available people's receiver radio which was owned by 70% of the population by 1939. The effectiveness of this propaganda ~~especially~~ can be observed in the 1938 Kristallnacht, ~~whereby~~ in which thousands of synagogues, Jewish homes and businesses were damaged by regular German people in reaction to the assassination of a German embassy official in Paris by a Jewish extremist. This shows how, without state intervention, the people of Germany had been united against a common 'enemy' through anti-semitic



(Section A continued) propaganda, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda in increasing support for the state, rather than support for Hitler doing so.

To conclude, support for Hitler was not the main reason for the lack of effective opposition as there is no correlation between the example of Hitler's apparent popularity and ~~the~~ the lack of opposition. The SS Gestapo State was far more effective at targeting and removing opposition such as the Red Shock Troop, working in conjunction with the law on opposition to prevent the arising of any organised opposition. Furthermore, Germans were united more by a hatred of their enemies as shown in Kristallnacht, than they were by an overwhelming support for Hitler, showing that support for Hitler was not the primary reason for the lack of effective support for the Nazi Government.



(Section A continued)



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(Section A continued)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 20 MARKS



SECTION B

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

- 3** How accurate is it to say that the role of German women continued to be that of wife and mother in the years 1933-89?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)

OR

- 4** How far would you agree with the view that the stability of the Federal Republic of Germany was mainly achieved by avoiding the constitutional problems of the Weimar Republic?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)



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SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 3 ☒

Question 4 ☒

17 marks

Avoidance of Weimar - Adenauer strength & prevention of
Eisenhower
extremism.

Unity force of post political in the 1950s.

Efficient removal of opposition.

The avoidance of the ^{constitutional problems} ~~mistakes~~ of the Weimar Government was ^{the main} reason for the stability of the FRG governments, as not only did it help prevent extremism from arising, but it also effected ~~Eisenhower~~ ^{and other} policy and the ~~offer~~ ^{initial} strength of leadership from Adenauer. However, the ~~strong force of~~ ^{economic policy success} responsible for much of the ~~stability~~ ^{early} stability, was not a reaction to the mistakes of the Weimar entirely, so the stability of the FRG was not entirely down to that factor. The criteria for judgement in this case is based upon ~~the~~ ^{to what degree} each stabilising factor was a reaction to the Weimar era's constitutional failure.

The initial strength of Adenauer's ^{coalition governments} and the stability of consequent governments was incredibly important in the stability of the FRG state, and was certainly a reaction to the failures of



(Section B continued)

the Weimar era. The initial Adenauer government coalition between the CDU and CSU was incredibly important in the stability of the FRG, as it was the government responsible for the ^{initial} implementation of the basic law in West Germany, as the combination of stable and democratic government was incredibly good for stabilising the FRG and preventing a collapse of government. This was because, unlike the Weimar Constitution before it, the Basic Law prevented an oversaturation of the political system by ~~the~~ putting a 5% threshold ~~on the parties~~ on the number of votes needed to gain representation in the Bundestag. This prevented the situation that the Weimar Gov. suffered from whereby it's political system was oversaturated with 28 different parties, making coalition government near-impossible to effectively achieve. Adenauer's CDU/CSU coalition, alongside subsequent SPD/FPD coalitions were stable down to the fact that only 2 parties had to negotiate to form a government, avoiding the mass collapses seen in the Weimar, which had 9 separate governments between 1918 & 1933. Therefore, the stability of Adenauer's coalitions, and subsequent governments was down to the constitutional ruling of Weimar Germany, thus meaning the main reason



(Section B continued)

for the stability of the FRG was
down to the reaction to the ^{Constitutional} ~~instability~~ ^{misdeeds}
of the Weimar.

Economic policy was something ~~interesting~~
that was incredibly integral to the stability
of the FRG era. Where the Weimar era,
had indeed failed to manage the economy, with
the hyperinflation crisis of 1923 and the
depression of 1929-33 showing failures in economic
policy, this was not down to any constitutional
failure. Rather, the policies implemented were poor -
the mass printing of money in 1922 & 23 deepened
the inflationary crisis of post-war Germany exponentially,
caused by the massive reparations of the Treaty of Versailles,
and Brüning's heavy 1930 taxation policies deepened
the recession - but there was no constitutional
flaw which caused this. The FRG's implementation
of the Bundesbank in 1957 to control
inflation and interest rates, and the 1948
currency reforms to prevent the failures of the
German currency in the 1920s were reactions
to failures of Weimar Germany, but
were fundamentally not reactions to any constitutional errors,
as constitution is defined by the system of government,
not poor policy making decisions. The economic miracle
was also not entirely down to policy, with the



(Section B continued) 1951 Adenauer was boasting the German export industry highly, with the popularity of the economic success winning Adenauer the only 50% single party majority in the history of Germany in 1957. Therefore, not only was economic success instrumental in the stability of the FRG, but it was more a reaction to FRG policy failure rather than avoidance of constitutional errors.

However, ~~perhaps~~ the efficient removal of opposition by the governments of the FRG was ~~the most important~~ fundamentally underpinned by the avoidance of the constitutional failures of the Weimar Era.

The Basic Law stated that no anti-constitutional or anti-democratic party was able to operate in the political system of the FRG. Obviously a clause to prevent the rise of ^{another} Nazi Party, it also banded the KPD in 1956 down to communism being anti-democratic in its political outlook.

This was almost certainly a reaction to the stalemate of the early 30s whereby the Nazi and Communist parties held over 50% of the seats in the Reichstag, and as each party was anti-constitutional, government was impossible without including an extreme party in a coalition - a scenario which led to the Nazi rise to power. The Basic Law meant that this scenario could not arise, and in



(Section B continued) Conjunction with the 5% clause held, prevented the rise of any extreme or destabilising force in FRG politics, showing that an urgency to avoid the constitutional mistakes of the Weimar was responsible for the stability of the FRG.

To conclude, the ~~constitutional~~ stability of the FRG government was indeed down to the avoidance of the Weimar era's constitutional failures, as although the stability of government brought by economic success was primarily down to an avoidance of Weimar policy flaws rather than the constitutional flaws, the 5% clause that blocked out extreme parties and prevented oversaturation of the system and the ability to ban unconstitutional parties were definitely reactions to the Weimar's failures. As both major politically stabilising factors were influenced by the constitutional failures of the Weimar, in comparison to the early stability brought by economic policy, it is evident that the stability of the FRG was down to the ~~success of the~~ avoidance of failures made by the Weimar constitution.



(Section B continued)

Blank lined area for writing answers.



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(Section B continued)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 20 MARKS



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SECTION C

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 5 Historians have different views about how far Hitler's foreign policy was responsible for the Second World War. Analyse and evaluate the extracts and use your own knowledge of the issues to explain your answer to the following question.

How far do you agree with the view that war broke out in 1939 because of the miscalculations of other European statesmen?

20 marks

(20)

There is much debate over who is ^{responsible} ~~adaptable~~ for the outbreak of war in 1939 - be it lack of intervention from allies and a miscalculation - the argument put forward by Lee in extract 1, or the over zealous desire for power and military prowess, argued by Kershaw in extract 2. The first extract seems the more plausible, as it takes into account the precedent set by the allied powers in the years leading up to the war, rather than laying the blame entirely on the shoulders of Hitler as extract 2 argues.

Extract 1 fundamentally argues for the miscalculations of European statesmen, as it highlights the 'diversion of Britain and France to against Italian aggression' as the cover for the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, showing how the two powers took little notice of Hitler's move into the Ruhr. Indeed, Britain and France were occupied with Italian atrocities in Abyssinia, but furthermore, the British especially, showed little regard for the Treaty of Versailles' strict regulation



(Section C continued) on Germany. Indeed, the Anglo-German naval pact saw Britain assist Germany in breaking the naval limit imposed by the Treaty, and evidently showed a fundamental miscalculation by the British and French as to the desires of the Nazi government. Furthermore, the reoccupation of the Rhineland was one that could have been reversed by the superior French army, but was not down to a combination of distraction and lack of comprehension of the grant of the remilitarisation. Alongside this, what Lee terms as 'Chamberlain's strong determination to avoid a European conflict' was shown in the Munich Conference's handing of the Sudetenland to Hitler, but furthermore in the lack of promised British action in the German ~~occupation~~ invasion of the rest of Czechoslovakia. This set a precedent for a lack of intervention, even when promised, by Britain and France, and thus means the signing of the Anglo-French pact - or rather 'misreading' - based upon the advice of Hitler's 'England Expert' Robertopp, his foreign minister, was a decision made based upon precedent and a ~~miscalculation~~ miscalculation of European statesmen, German or otherwise. Therefore, Lee's source provides an ~~an~~ incredibly credible argument as it displays the mistakes of European statesmen that led to the invasion and miscalculation of ~~the invasion of Poland~~ ^{the leading to the invasion} of Poland in 1939.



(Section C continued)

Extract 2 presents the argument that Hitler's action in 1939 was one of personal force - that his 'personal psyche pushed him forwards'. Although Hitler did indeed defy the cautious advice of his Generals, the decision was not only his - it was advised by his foreign minister Ribbentrop - whom claimed Britain would not act on it's promise to defend Poland. Furthermore, it states that Hitler held a 'contempt' for the military ~~a statement~~ which motivated his defiance of military advice. However, policy in the early years of his government that of non-intervention in the army - suggests otherwise, as the hierarchy of the army was not touched until the 1938 removal of the Commander-in-Chief on the grounds of a sex scandal, which allowed Hitler to non-forcefully gain the role as leader of the army. This lack of intervention shows that it is unlikely that Hitler deliberately acted out of contempt for the army in 1939, as Kershaw asserts. The extract also implies, in the statement that 'he thought of himself as a military genius', that Hitler had always sought war in Poland, and did not have any desire to take Poland peacefully.



(Section C continued) This, too, is an oversimplification, as it puts the responsibility for the conflict solely on Hitler. It is apparent in events leading up to the conflict, such as the 1938 anti-comintern pact invitation Poland received from Germany, that diplomacy was Hitler's first port of call for Poland, opting to make it a satellite state - preventing Russian invasion whilst Germany expanded; therefore showing that Hitler, rather than thinking himself a 'military genius' as Kerzhenevsky states, saw war in Poland to be the only way to protect ~~itself~~ itself from Russia.

To conclude, Extract 1 proposes the far more credible argument. ^{Lee's} ~~the~~ acknowledgement of the external factors such as the lack of ~~the~~ action from Britain and France leading to the miscalculation made by Hitler, spreading the responsibility of miscalculation across the European powers, is more convincing, in this case, than Kerzhenevsky's argument that Hitler's own desire for power meant he was the only leader who miscalculated. The lack of action over Anschluss, the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia - miscalculations by the British and French - set a precedent for lack of ~~the~~ intervention in Europe by the European powers, that meant, as ~~the~~ Lee states 'war broke out because of the miscalculations of others, rather than it being the plan of a determined and evil genius'.



(Section C continued)



(Section C continued)



(Section C continued)



(Section C continued)

TOTAL FOR SECTION C = 20 MARKS
TOTAL FOR PAPER = 60 MARKS



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